Abstract-The smart grid is driving the deployment of networked components within the traditional power grid to achieve greater reliability and control. However, those cyber components are creating new security vulnerabilities that could lead to significant disruptions if exploited maliciously. We propose a comprehensive cost model designed to assist in the selection of responses to malicious attacks on an advanced metering infrastructure. The cost model reflects the costs of response actions due to outages in the distribution grid, disruptions of the electricity market, and violations of contractual agreements among stakeholders. We also present a realistic implementation of the cost model using ArcGIS for topology generation and GridLAB-D for grid simulation. The cost model is a step forward toward achievement of automated resilience in the smart grid. It also provides comprehensive modeling for system dynamics and operation costs, while relieving utilities from the burden of manually assigning costs for response actions and modeling attacker steps.
the nature (accidental versus malicious) of the causes of the underlying impairments. Indeed, designing a comprehensive response system that can take into account alerts from both cyber and power sensors to automatically decide on optimal recovery actions is a significant challenge. A major element of the challenge is the requirement for a cost model that can accurately predict the costs of possible response actions.
The goal of this paper is to make progress toward intrusion tolerance by introducing a practical cost model in the context of advanced metering infrastructures (AMIs). An AMI serves as the communication backbone for smart meters and enables new applications, such as frequent remote meter reading or demand response features. Cyber threats against an AMI have the potential to penetrate the utility network or to exploit meters to disrupt the power grid. The significant number of devices in a typical AMI makes manual response to incidents nearly impossible. As a result, it is necessary to develop an accurate cost model that allows systems to support automated decision-making.
In particular, we propose a service-oriented cost model that uses a dependency graph to model the system. It computes the cost of a response action using the deterioration of quality of services and possible attack consequences. We describe the quality of service using the traditional security attributes: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). Finally, we convert these to a financial cost. In some cases, service-level agreements (SLAs) can be used to directly map degradation in a security attribute to financial cost. For example, loss of availability can be penalized. However, some attributes (like integrity) are not likely to be covered by an SLA; we compute the consequences on such losses on the business process. The consequences are system-dependent and could include possible attacks, and loss of production, among other effects.
This paper makes the following contributions. 1) We introduce a practical cost model workflow that can translate system logs and cyber alerts into response costs. 2) We propose a method to model the service level of services using dependency graph and low-level components. 3) We provide a method to generate a dependency graph from an AMI routing topology, and we explore the impact of the change of security state in the context of an attack. 4) We show case the cost model using response selection during an attack scenario, and we assess the potential disruption that a given number of compromised meters could cause.
II. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the concept of a response cost model in the context of the smart grid. Zonouz et al. [1] introduced the response and recovery engine (RRE) and shown how RRE can be used in a power grid environment, but the concept of cost is left as a parameter in the model that needs to be provided by operators. In the general context of traditional IT systems, that idea of using static costs has been studied by [2] - [7] , where the approach consists of generating a taxonomy of possible response actions and then assigning a static cost value to each action. The main limitations of that approach are that it requires operators to estimate a large number of parameters, and it does not capture dynamic costs due to system changes.
Other researchers [8] , [9] went beyond static costs by decomposing the cost of actions into different sub-costs to better capture the impact of actions on the system. Luo et al. [10] described a solution for linearly increasing static costs over time, while Anuar et al. [11] leveraged an analytical hierarchy process to compute impact factors in addition to using static costs. Those approaches reduce the inflexibility of previous static techniques, but they still suffer from requiring a large number of parameters that are not updated based on the dynamic state of the system.
One approach to that challenge has been to explore dependency graphs. Toth and Kruegel [12] dynamically updated the availability of the system by propagating in the graph the impact of nodes' becoming unavailable because of response actions. Jahnke et al. [13] extended that approach by using three separate graphs to cover CIA properties. Kheir et al. [14] combined those graphs into a unified formalism by labeling nodes with a vector and by using a matrix to capture how the different security properties depend on each other.
We build on top of those solutions by focusing on their main drawback, namely their need for significant operator involvement to define the many parameters. In addition, this paper differs from related studies on dynamic cost models by providing output that can be directly used by an automated reasoning system. We describe a complete workflow that has been tailored for the AMI, which is one of the largest cyber-physical systems. Table I defines the acronyms we use throughout this paper. 
III. RESPONSE COST MODEL
When accidental failures or malicious events occur, operators of large infrastructures such as AMIs have to make critical decisions in order to recover the system and to keep it operating. A diverse set of sensors provides multiple feeds of input raw data that need to be converted into information that a human operator can comprehend. The objective of a cost model is to perform that conversion task. At a high level, a cost model takes static input, such as system configurations and system topologies, and dynamic input, such as live feeds of alerts and system logs, and identifies the state of the system, from which the financial impact of possible system changes can be computed. System changes include failures, attacks, and security responses. We are particularly interested in the responses; do we automatically provide quantified decision-making support to operators who are responding to cybersecurity events?
When a response action is taken to change the system state, the notion of response cost can be divided into an operational cost (required to perform the action) and an impact cost (as a result of the action), which measures the consequences of an attack. Indeed, any action requires a preparation phase and leads to a consequence phase, and costs can be estimated for both of those phases. Mathematically, the cost of an action is computed with
The evaluation of those costs requires an in-depth understanding of the system to enable accurate predictions of system behaviors. To gain predictive capabilities, one needs first to design a dependency model from which state changes of a set of components can be precisely trickled down to other components. Several models can be used to define dependency relationships; we chose to use a dependency graph. Fig. 1 presents a high-level framework to tag the dependency graph with input data and cost conversions for the special case of an AMI.
An important feature of an AMI is that it combines a power infrastructure and a communication infrastructure. We assume that the configuration and topology for both of those infrastructures is static and provided to the model. The AMI routing information captures the communication network topology and is used along with system logs and intrusion detection system sensor alerts to generate a dependency graph. From the dependency graph, the security state of the system can be computed and divided into impacts on CIA of the different components. Understanding the security posture of the cybercomponents enables the model to simulate possible failures in the power distribution infrastructure. The simulations are used to compute outage metrics. Finally, the impact on CIA and the magnitude of outages are converted into financial values that can be presented to an operator or to an automated response system as a response cost.
IV. DEPENDENCY GRAPH GENERATION
Our cost model uses a dependency graph of an AMI to evaluate the effect of a response action on the security properties of services in an AMI. The dependency graph, G = (P, E), models the dependency relations between the different components C and services S in a system, where P = C ∪ S. The edges in the graph E model the dependency relation between the components and services. Each studied system has its own set of services and components. Moreover, the relationship between the services and components relates to the system configuration. We define the general method for generating the dependency graphs and also specify the method for creating them for AMIs.
A. Services
In a general computing system, services in a system are implemented via processes running on hosts. For example, in a traditional IT system, those processes could be HTTP services, Kerberos, or an encryption service. Those processes offer the service over the network to other hosts or users.
In our case study of an AMI, we consider the following services: 1) a meter-reading service; 2) a real-time pricing information service; and 3) a remote commands service, S = {S mr , S pi , S rc }. We chose those services as a representative set of operations typically sent in AMIs. We note that this list is not exhaustive. Our focus is to propose a framework for response cost that can be easily extended to cover other services. Fig. 2 shows a sample dependency graph containing the meter-reading service. More end-to-end services are performed in an AMI, but we focus on the listed subset in S, as they provide a major portion of AMI traffic.
B. Components
Components are elements of the system that enable a service to function. We define four classes of components to understand how they relate to each other: 1) data sources and sinks; 2) cipher elements; and 3) routing elements. We use D (location,service) to describe the data elements. For example D (ID,mr) is the data element for the meter-reading service in a meter, where ID is an identifier used to specify a unique meter. The identification of the components of each service defines the dependency relationship in the graph.
Smart meters implement ANSI C12.19 for data storage and ANSI C12.22 [15] , [16] write messages are received from the head-end. That launches special functions that control appliances and turn services on and off remotely. Finally, some services use the cipher components for encryption and authentication of the messages exchanged between the meters and head-end. The basic building components of those operations are keys, ciphers, and hash functions. In our AMI study case, the cipher operations are defined in the C12.22 standard security mechanism [15] . Standard C12.22 security uses the EAX mode for authentication and protects the privacy of the message using a shared key. Our dependency graph models the security mode through a set of keys K and cipher E k i (m). A key k i ∈ K is shared between a meter M i and the head-end. The head-end has the following high-level components: 1) a database D (he,S(m i )) , which stores the data for each service for each meter; 2) meter keys k i 's; 3) a utility key (pk, sk); and 4) an encryption-decryption engine ED eng , which performs the cipher. It is necessary to describe the key management and generation process, because it affects the state of the cipher components. Key management is usually proprietary, with each vendor designing its own scheme. However, any key management scheme, whether based on symmetric or asymmetric keys has the same functions. They include key generation, distribution, key revocation, and key replacement. For our purposes, we are not concerned with the exact implementations for those functions, as long as they perform their intended functionality.
C. Graph Generation
The dependency relation D = P × P defines the transitive relation among the components and services in G. That is,
In the following, we provide a method to construct the dependency graph using routing information, the information flow, and the abstracted service definition discussed in Section IV-B. For each service, the graph is generated by tracing service messages from the hosts to the users. For example, in an AMI, a message originates at the head-end, is sent to a meter M l through a WAN connection to the collector (CR k ), and then is routed using a wireless mesh network. The message is verified through use of the key and the cipher D k l (m) and is written to the C12.19 table entry. Thus, a service in an AMI depends on the state of the wireless channel that transmitted the message, the set of meters that relayed the message, the different components in the originating meter, and the state of the head-end.
We start with the set of all routes R in the system, those are the paths from each meter back to the head-end. A meter M i could connect directly or through a set of meters (using a wireless network) to the collector CR j , we represent those paths using M i CR j . The collectors connect using a WAN or direct link to the head end. The total set of paths is M i CR j WAN − −− → Headend. We create the routing graph, which represents the backbone of our dependency graph. Then we attach our services and components to the respective hosts. The last step is to connect the dependent services and components. Each meter node contains the services in S and the dependent C12.22/C12.19 entities we identified.
Each node in the graph is tagged with a vector V[C, I, A] ∈ [0, 1] 3 that represents the current security level of the node in terms of CIA, with 0 being the least secure state and 1 being the most secure state. The index is interpreted as the current link capacity in the case of availability. For example, if 50% of traffic is dropped through a link, then V link [A] = 0.5. However, confidentiality and integrity are binary, with 1 for the secure state and 0 representing the insecure state.
D. Weight Matrix
Each edge in G is tagged with a function,
The function is a mapping between the security properties (CIA) of a component and its dependent. That is, F defines the effects of a compromise of any of the security properties of a component on its dependent node in G. We implement the function F as a 3 × 3 weight dependency matrix W.
1) Data Nodes:
If the CIA of stored data is affected, then the respective security property of the dependent component is lost. For example, if meter-reading data D mr is not available, then the billing service S mr for the meter is not available. The weight matrix is a diagonal matrix with 1s on the diagonal and 0s elsewhere.
2) Cipher Nodes: The loss of confidentiality of a key leads to loss of confidentiality of the message, and loss of integrity. It does not, however, lead to loss of availability for the dependents. If the integrity of a key is compromised, then the service is using a mismatching key for the security mechanisms. Thus, availability and confidentiality are lost for the end services. If A is compromised, then either C is compromised because data are sent unencrypted, or A is compromised because the data are not being pushed through.
3) Communication Nodes: The security state of the communication link has a direct effect on the messages passing through it. That is, if the link loses availability, the service loses availability; this also holds for confidentiality and integrity. The weight matrix is thus a simple diagonal matrix.
E. Example
We want to generate the dependency graph of an AMI deployment. Our AMI has three smart meters {m 1 , m 2 , m 3 }, a collector CR 1 , and the head-end (HE). The meters have the following topology:
and CR 1 WAN − −− → HE. We want to study the meter-reading service in this example specified S mr . We only picked on service to make the example visually simple. For this service each meter has a data component D (i,mr) , a key component k i to encrypt the readings, and a cipher E that uses the key. The head-end has a copy of the key components {k 1 , k 2 , k 3 }, a data component to store the readings D (he,mr) for the meter-reading service, and a cipher component E to process the messages. The collector is merely a routing device that does not alter the content of the messages between the meters and the headend. We generated the dependency for our AMI deployment shown in Fig. 2. Fig. 2 shows a sample dependency graph in an AMI. In this example, the meter-reading service S (1,mr) of meter M 1 depends directly on the data component D 1 and the cipher E. The existence of the previous components depends on the meter M 1 . The communication depends on the path between the M 1 and the HE that includes meter M 2 and the collection relay CR 1 . 
V. SECURITY STATE COMPUTATION
The cost model uses the dependency graph to compute the consequences of a response on system dynamics. The model computes a vector V S i [CIA] , which is the security vector of all services in an AMI. We begin by initializing the dependency graph with the intrinsic security status of the graph. The intrinsic state is due to the previous state and new alerts and events that take place in the AMI. The events could be, for example a disconnected meter or a compromised key. The next step is to inject a response and evaluate the effect of the response on services. That is described in the update algorithm, Fig. 4 . First, we inject the response R, much as in to the Result(.) function in the initialization algorithm. For example, if an action is a block, then we have to change the availability of the affected parties. The second step is to propagate the new vector values and compute the per-service security indices. We loop over the services in the graph; ServiceSet(.) returns all the vertices that are services. We start with a service S i and find the end-to-end dependencies of the service, going from the meter to which the service belongs to the head-end. We then loop over all sets of (D , E, D); this is a single hop in the graph. V D is the security state due to the dependency. We update V D by propagating the security state in its predecessor, line 4, where W is the weight matrix in Section IV-D. We compute the V[CIA] for S i as the minimum security state along the path, line 6. If a dependent component of a service S i loses confidentiality or integrity, then the service loses that property. The same argument applies to availability, because the link with the smallest availability acts as the bottleneck in the path. Finally, we compute the total V[CIA] for each service in the AMI as the fraction of meters that were affected in line 9, where N is the number of meters in the AMI.
VI. CIA CONVERSION
The third step of the dependency analysis is to convert the security vector V[CIA] into the financial cost incurred by a utility as described in Section III. The cost breakdown for loss of security in AMI services is highlighted in Table II . The conversion method accounts for the possible consequences of the responses by modeling the effects of an attack on the power distribution system without explicitly enumerating the possible attack steps. For example, the table shows that the cost of loss of integrity and availability of pricing information and remote commands is due to outages caused by a malicious increase in power demand. The other factors we are considering are energy theft (electricity market) and SLAs that penalize degradation of service.
A. Meter-Reading Compromise
Compromising the integrity of meter-reading data could result in receipt of inaccurate metering data by a utility. The meter data are used to bill the customer for power usage; thus, any inaccuracies mean that either the customer is being overcharged, or the utility is losing revenue. Energy theft occurs when meter data reflect a value less than the actual one, causing revenue loss for the utility. The cost for the utility is shown
T is the duration of the period in which the response is enabled, and $/kWh is the cost of power during that period per kWh per unit of time. EstimatedUsageDiff, computed in 3, estimates the value of the power taken during the theft
γ ∈ [0, 1] is an index that models the attacker's aggressiveness; more usage is to be expected from a powerful attacker. Other methods could be used to estimate the amount of energy theft possible; those methods include using probabilistic attack models to estimate energy theft based on the sophistication of the attacker, the defenses deployed, and the success of the attack [18] , [19] . However, the accuracy of those models is debatable; they require knowledge about the attacks and their prevalence, that is largely unknown to the system administrator. Moreover, such techniques are computationally intensive, and would make online use of the cost model infeasible. We believe that the linear model for the effect of the attack can help system administrator determine the cost of a response effectively. If meter readings become unavailable, then the utility would miss a T amount of readings. Such a compromise would not lead to a cost for either the utility or the customer, since the data are already stored within the meter and can be transmitted after the AMI has been restored to a secure state. However, an SLA penalty would be incurred because of the unavailability of the service.
B. Real-Time Pricing Information Compromise
Pricing information in an AMI is used for real-time billing. The price is sent to the meter, and the customer pays for the energy used based on that price. If the pricing information is unavailable, the customer uses electricity in the "blind." This means that he or she cannot adjust usage if the price increases. So, we assume that it is only fair for the utility to switch back to the flat rate pricing scheme, by which customers pay a constant rate per kWh. The utility loses revenue if the flat rate is less than the current price of energy, because the utility is covering the difference in cost. If the flat rate is more than the actual rate, then the customer is overpaying for energy. The cost conversion algorithm estimates the usage of customers using historic data within a region to compute the revenue loss for the utility
If the integrity of pricing information is breached, then we risk a sudden increase in demand as the low prices drive demand. More details on the cost of power demand increases are presented in the next section. Pricing information is public, so there are no concerns about privacy compromise.
C. Remote Commands Compromise
Service commands remotely control customer service and appliances. That enables demand-response, which controls prices by varying demand during critical times. The loss of integrity of remote commands allows an adversary to arbitrarily increase power demand in the power distribution system. The demand increase has two cost repercussions for a utility if the new demand is a significant fraction of the total demand on the transmission grid. The first direct cost is the fact that the increase of demand will require the utility to purchase generation power at a high cost. The indirect cost is incurred by local outages due to severe and persistent demand hikes. Outages are caused when components of the distribution grid (such as transformers, fuses, and capacitor banks) are overloaded for long periods of time. It is important to note that the distribution grid is designed to handle the maximum possible demand for a short period of time. Engineers measure the peak demand over 15-min periods for customers. The demand factor, the ratio of the maximum demand over total load, is around 0.2. Then designers compute the maximum 15-min peak demand for the set of customers to be handled by the electric equipment. Finally, the rating on the equipment is selected to handle the compute maximum peak demand for a short period of time. Thus, if the demand is increased above the expected value for more than 15 min, equipment will get damaged [20] . Modeling of the distribution grid is used to predict the costs in the case of increased demand. The value of the increased demand is found
γ is the same parameter as in 3; it models the effect of the attack. It can be set to depend on the criticality of the location or on the level of pessimism the utility is exercising. Outages require that trucks be rolled out to respond and repair damage. They also cause losses for customers; the cost for customers is highlighted in [21] based on an empirical study.
D. Cost of Privacy
Data within an AMI contain private information about the appliances used by the customer and the time a customer uses those appliances. This information can be used to assess the wealth of a person, for advertising purposes by ad agencies, or for criminal activity. Protecting the confidentiality of this information means that the data should not be accessed by unauthorized entities during transit in the AMI network or while stored at the head-end in the utility. There are two types of data that could lead to load identification: 1) the actual power usage information (meter readings) and 2) the demand-response mechanisms that control specific appliances. Several papers propose methods for identification of loads that use usage data [22] - [24] and through demand-response systems [25] . Other researchers were able to identify what was being viewed on televisions [26] . Researchers have proposed methods to preserve the privacy of AMI users through special protocols or by installing home batteries. The protocols use homomorphic encryption to transmit and store data without revealing the content, the meter readings, or commands. On the other hand, the battery, when installed, will serve as a buffer, so that it stores power that is used by appliances; that way, power usage will be constant [27] . Although it is not easy to put a price on privacy, there are several methods for doing so. New laws related to smart girds are getting passed: for example, California's smart grid laws require utilities to protect usage information. So when privacy is lost utilities will be vulnerable to lawsuits, which typically result in major financial losses. Moreover, a penalty could be enforced, similar to North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection violation penalties. Further, recurring privacy compromises might lead customers to lose confidence and change service providers, thus leading to long-term cost to the utility.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND STUDY CASE
We now provide lower-level details about the implementation. We start with the details of the dependency graph implementation. We then specify the method for injecting the responses and computing the security vector V i [CIA] . Finally, we convert the security vector to the financial cost incurred by the utility due to the distribution grid.
A. Dependency Graph
In a practical deployment setting, the dependency graph is generated from a grid topology and meter network information. The meter network information is the list of neighbors reachable by each meter. We wrote a script that takes geographic information system (GIS) data as the sole input and automatically infers an AMI deployment configuration. To test the script implementation, we obtained GIS data from the publicly available parcel tax data of a small town (with a population of 7282 inhabitants in 2011). We assumed a single meter per parcel, and we located a number of cell relays to cover the GIS region. We generated the topology of the deployment. Then the cell relays (CRs) were added to the network to cover the deployed meters, allowing 3000 m per relay. We formed the shortest routes between the meters and the closest CR in the area. Finally, the dependency graph was generated using the algorithm specified in Section IV. All security vectors were initialized to the secure state of the network, that is, V i = [1, 1, 1], where i represents indices of nodes in the system.
B. Execution Model
The proposed cost model starts by updating the security state of the system by updating the dependency graph. The update changes the security vectors for affected nodes in the system, and then the new values are propagated throughout the dependency graph. A response R has to be injected into the dependency graph in order to be evaluated. Section VII-C explains the process of injecting a response. After the response has been injected, the update algorithm is run again in order to update the security vectors in the graph. Finally, we have to convert the new values into the financial values using the process described in Section VI. During the operation of the system the topology of the AMI will change due to the addition/removal of new meters and collectors. In case of a topology change, we need to update the dependency graph to reflect the new changes. We add or remove the affected nodes and rerun the shortest path algorithm in the previous section to update the graph. The state of the new nodes and links are initialized to the secure state. We recompute the security state of the system using the algorithms in Section V. This process might seem costly because we have to recompute links in the dependency graph. However, adding a single meter affects only a small subset of meters that are within the same geographic vicinity. Implementation details on the financial conversion process when the distribution grid is affected are discussed in Section VII-D.
C. Response Injection
Each action induces changes in the dependency graph; the security vector V[CIA] is updated based on the type of action and the expected effects on the system.
The taxonomy of response actions described in [28] has two kinds of actions, learning actions and modifying actions. Learning actions do not change the topology of the network; instead, they add traffic to the network in order to gain more information about an event. When a learning action is injected, the availability of a meter or a link is affected because of the traffic needed to get the data. On the other hand, modifying actions can either block or limit an attack, or recover from an insecure state. A limiting response action that blocks a set of meters results in voiding of the availability of the meters, so V[A] = 0. Reboot actions cause unavailability for the duration of the reboot process. Recovery actions generally reset the security vector V to [1, 1, 1] . However, some actions, such as flashing of a new firmware or verification of routes and meters, temporarily cause reduction in availability. The last step in the communication-side implementation is to update the security vectors. The update algorithm computes the new security vectors in the network. We then convert the CIA indices to the financial cost based on the expected consequences of the action and the actual cost of implementing the action.
D. Distribution Grid Simulation
Parts of the conversion process require prediction of outage frequency and duration. We assume that an outage consists of prolonged overloading of parts of the distribution grid. Localized outages require the utility to dispatch crews to repair and restore service, thus inducing cost to the utility. GridLAB-D [29] is used to simulate the grid while the power demand of residential loads is being increased. GridLAB-D is an open-source, agent-based distribution grid simulator developed and maintained by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. We feed the new security vectors to the GridLAB-D, which determines the amount of extra demand for power that might occur because of injected response actions. That models the notion of consequences enabled by the action after an attacker executes a particular attack.
GridLAB-D's reliability module models faults in the grid that result from short-circuit faults, such as single-line-ground and line-line faults. GridLAB-D allows the user to set the target, timings, and frequency of a fault. GridLAB-D does not model faults or consequences due to overloaded components in the grid; however, it notes the overload. For our purposes, we run the simulation twice; first, we increase demand and record the lines with power flow over the rated level. Then, we inject the faults to model possible sagging of lines, destroyed fuses, or damaged transformers. GridLAB-D simulates the faults and reports outage frequency and sizes and some relevant reliability metrics. The cost for a utility to fix the fault is then estimated using an assumption about the cost to repair an outage, SAIDI × repairCost(t), where SAIDI stands for the system average interruption duration index, which shows the average duration of a sustained interruption for a customer during the reporting period.
E. Performance
The cost model of response actions is part of a response engine decision algorithm. The response engine works in an online fashion to decide on a suitable response during a security incident. The cost model should be efficient in terms of memory usage and runtime in order to get used in an online response system.
1) Dependency Graph:
We implemented the dependency graph using an adjacency list to store the state of the different nodes in the system. Each meter node has eight components, including three services, four data objects, and one cryptographic key, and is tagged with a security vector that holds three floating values (for CIA). As a result, the memory footprint of the graph is 2N×(3 services + 4 data+1 key + 1 m)× (20 bytes). A medium size utility with 1 000 000 customers will require of around 1 GB of storage. Moreover, we can estimate the number of relationships in the dependency graph. In an AMI, a meter is four hops away, on average, from a CR. The number of relationships added by a meter, accounting for three services, is on average 20. The number is due to dependencies between the services in the meter and the meter resources, the number of hops between the meter and a CR, and the connection between the CR and HE. Thus we have 20 million relations for a 1 million meter deployment. We implemented a small version of the dependency graph using Neo4j. Neo4j is an open-source graph database. Neo4j is capable of supporting around 34 billion relationships and nodes [30] . Our implementation specified the queries that find the service sets and dependency path. Moreover, the algorithm in Fig. 4 has a worst complexity of O(|P||E|); however, the update algorithm is optimized for the AMI study case. The algorithm updates the security vector per service by traversing the path from the service to the head-end. Since the average path length in an AMI is relatively small, the algorithm has an average-complexity running time, O(|P|).
2) Grid Simulation: Our current GridLAB-D is running on a single core. Byun et al. [31] showed that a 200 000-bus node requires 67.64 s to simulate. They reached a 62× speedup using a field programmable gate array (FPGA) implementation.
VIII. CASE STUDY
In this section, we show how the cost model works in a case study. First, we investigate the level of power consumption needed to drive the distribution grid to a critical state. Then, we use the parameters computed in the first step to study the costs of responding to an attack scenario that compromises the demand-response mechanism in an AMI.
A. Threat Model
The adversary in this case study wants to overload demand in the distribution system and cause outages by damaging equipment (such as lines and transformers). We assume that the adversary is eavesdropping on and storing AMI traffic. We assume that the adversary has the capability to inject and replay the stored packets. For example, if the adversary replays a remote control message that switches an appliance ON, the appliance will be switched on. We assume that the attacker is exploiting a vulnerability in the meters that allows packets to be replayed. Please note that we do not assume that the attacker have compromised the encryption keys; they just collect the packets and replay them without modifying them.
The resources of the adversary in this scenario are related to how many physical sniffing devices can they deploy. If they are amateurs with limited resources. can they cover a small area of the AMI and thus have a minimal effect on the distribution system. On the other hand, if the adversaries are resourceful, they can cover a large area of the AMI and increase the demand significantly, causing outages and equipment damage. We model the resourcefulness of the adversary and the intensity of the threat using the parameter γ ∈ [0, 1].
B. Demand Increase
We simulated the IEEE 37-node test feeder [32] , a standard distribution grid topology that has 37 nodes used for testing numerical algorithms, and varied the power consumption of loads in the topology. The simulation verified the power supply could be disrupted by an increase in demand. Moreover, the simulation found the minimum value of γ to be used in the cost model. We assumed that all loads in the topology were residential loads. Typical residential loads reflect a set of common high-power-demanding household appliances that are capable of generating 40 kW of demand. Table III shows the ratings of some common high-power-demanding appliances. Assume that demand-response systems typically control heavy loads in order to curtail demand during highdemand periods. The maximum possible power injection due to the 37 residential loads is P max = 1.5 MW.
We simulated the surge of demand that would result from increasing residential demand by γ × 40 kW. Fig. 5 shows the percentage of current level over the current rating in the main feeder as we increase the attacker aggressiveness γ . When the attacker aggressiveness increases, more meters are controlled, and more appliances can be controlled. By controlling more appliances, the attacker can increase power demand in the distribution system. The simulation confirms that increasing demand causes the current levels to increase beyond the rated levels of the feeders. The results show that it is possible to drive the distribution grid to a critical state with a minimum value of γ = 0.6. 
C. AMI Scenario
We wanted to showcase our cost model for response actions using an AMI under attack. We defined an AMI deployment with the assumptions given in Section IV. The AMI serves 37 customers, and we placed the meters according to the method suggested in Section VII. We considered a specific attack scenario based on the threat model, and defined two different response actions that would block the attack and recover to a secure state. The cost model computed the cost of the responses using the parameters shown in Table IV . Historic usage profiles and price forecasts were used to estimate the flat and peak demand rates, and SLAs were in place to penalize for loss of availability of some AMI services. Finally, the customers were connected to the distribution grid through use of the IEEE 37-node test feeder topology.
In our scenario, the adversary exploits a vulnerability that allows them to replay packets. The packets are assumed to be remote control packets for residential appliances. The stored packets are encrypted, so the attacker cannot modify them, they only collect and replay them. We assume that the exploit cannot be detected by the meters, that is the meter cannot detect the replayed packets.
1) Response Actions:
We consider two possible response actions. The first response, R1, is to rekey the meters. After the meters are rekeyed, the meter will not be able to decrypt the packets stored by the adversary, as they were encrypted with an older key. The meters are frequently rekeyed at a rate of T, until a patched firmware is sent to all meters. Meters are rekeyed because the attacker will store a new set of messages, encrypted with the new key, to restore the attack. Then, after T patch time, the meters are patched, and the rekeying stops. The second response, R2, rekeys all the meters once during the response strategy, and then blocks the remote command service. Then, after T patch , the meters are patched, and service is restored. The first response does not completely block the remote control service, but instead allows the remote service to run while it changes the AMI keys periodically. The response also risks the possibility of replaying some demand-response messages between the rekeying periods. The second response does not involve the risk of replaying demand-response messages, but it completely blocks the remote command service until a firmware fix is available.
2) Response Cost: The cost of R1 is shown in (6) . The rekeying process generates new meter keys at the head-end, and then sends them to the meters. The periodic key change causes short temporary unavailability of all services during the roll-out time. After the meters have been rekeyed, the attacker can reinitiate the attack and thus cause an outage in the distribution grid. The first part of the equation (SLA(All)) is the SLA penalty due to loss of availability of the AMI service. The second part of the equation reflects the cost of loss of availability of real-time pricing information due to the rekeying process, shown in (4). The last part of the cost is due to possible outages, as explained in Section VII-D C(R1) = SAIDI(γ ) × T × repairCost + V dr [I] (N × 3 kWh × 0.5 $/kWh + SLA(All))
where T trans is the time needed to roll out the keys during the rekeying process. The ratio T patch / T is the number of times meters are rekeyed. The cost of R2 is shown in (7) . The cost reflects the SLA penalty due to the unavailability of the remote control service of the AMI C(R2) = SLA(S rc ) × T patch .
D. Numerical Analysis
In this section, we compute the actual costs of the response actions R1 and R2 using the parameters in Table IV .
In those parameters, the SLA penalty for blocking the remote service is high, which is expected because the remote service provides demand-response, which offers major cost relief to the utility. The parameter repairCost is also relatively high, because it includes labor hours and rolling of trucks. The time needed to roll out the keys during the rekeying process is estimated as T trans = N × 500 ms.
We first computed the SAIDI due to R1. Since γ = 0.6, which represents the minimum value of demand when the distribution grid is in a critical state, we increase the failure rate to find the lowest failure rate at which the distribution grid begins to show sustainable outages. This paper showed that at a failure rate of 2 × 10 −5 , the SAIDI was about 6.
The cost of R1 is $3000, while the computed cost of R2 is $72 000. Even though R1 has SLA penalties for all services, the penalties are applied for such a short period of time that the actual cost diminishes. If T were longer, then the cost to repair outages could have been higher than the SLA penalty for the remote command service. As a result, based on the value of the parameters, the system recommends that R1 be applied if there is an attack against the demand-response system.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a comprehensive approach for cost modeling of response actions. The approach accounts for cost due to the operation of the action as well as the cost due to the action's consequences for the system. We proposed an extended dependency graph to model any system, and used it for AMI. We then defined methods to convert the response's impact on an AMI to a financial cost to the utility. The methods mainly account for losses due to changes in the physical system, in the form of outages and price fluctuations. Finally, we proposed using a simulator, GridLAB-D, to predict outages in the distribution grid due to power demand increases. The main contribution of this paper is that it offers a way to model response actions that requires a minimum of subjective input from the utility, as it uses the costs due to the physical grid to judge the importance of services, instead of requiring an administrator to set such a critical parameter manually.
